Abstract: This study seeks to extend hedge fund activism research to a country where the ownership structure is dominated by large major shareholders. Until now, studies about hedge fund activism mainly treated countries with dispersed ownership structures. Using an event study with 133 German hedge fund events between January 2000 and April 2008, we found that hedge fund activism shows significant positive short-term abnormal returns, which do not hold in the long term. It showed that family shareholders have a significant influence on the success of hedge fund activism. Moreover, it could be measured that hedge fund activism is especially successful if it tries to force the company to sell assets. This study provides empirical support for the influence of the ownership structure on the success of hedge fund activism. It indicates that large major shareholders impact hedge fund activism.
Introduction
The consequences of the separation of ownership and control occupy scholars not only since the work of Berle and Means (1932) . For many researchers, activism by large shareholders holds the promise of reducing the monitoring and incentive problems and improving the effectiveness of the corporation (Becht et al., 2007) . Before hedge funds occurred as activists, mutual funds and public pension funds were the primary players to engage in shareholder activism. Since the beginning of the 1990s, empirical studies have attempted to demonstrate the positive effects of shareholder activism on the development of the corporation (see e.g. Gordon and Pound, 1993; Nesbitt, 1994; Gillan, 1995) . Different parameters were used, most prominent among them being the development of shareholder value, the change in operating indicators and voting behaviour at proxy proposals. The results of all these studies lead to the conclusion that shareholder activism by mutual funds and public pension funds can only yield moderate changes in the corporate governance structure of corporations (Achleitner et al., 2010; Becht et al., 2007) and have no significant effect on corporate performance (Karpoff, 2001; Gillan and Starks, 2007) .
Shareholder activism by hedge funds began since the mid-1990s and can be considered as part of the deconstruction of the integrated banking model (Li, 2001) . The development originated in the USA and still has its centre there. The number of occurrences of the same and the public response were somewhat limited in the beginning. However, since 2003 the number of occurrences has grown steadily and steeply, so that in 2006, 90% of activist campaigns came from hedge funds (Greenwood and Schor, 2009) . The first studies about hedge fund activism were circulated in the mid-2000s (e.g. Bradley et al., 2006; Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009; Zenner et al., 2005) . 1 The majority of scholars used the filings of changes in voting rights published by the Securities and Exchange Commission. New shareholders who intend to influence the management of a corporation need to fill in the form 13d as soon as their voting rights exceed 5%. The shareholder must include details concerning the objectives, such as talking to the management or attempting to force the company to sell assets. The scholars chose event studies, with the shareholder value as dependent variable, to measure the effect of hedge fund activism. The event studies comprised short-term and long-term excess returns. In contrast to shareholder activism by mutual funds and public pension funds, all hedge fund studies until now measured a significant positive short-term return (e.g. Brav et al., 2008; Boyson and Mooradian, 2007; Clifford, 2008) . Although fewer studies deal with long-term abnormal returns (e.g. Clifford, 2008; Greenwood and Schor, 2009) , the results indicate that hedge fund activism also has a positive impact on longterm returns.
Whereas the results of studies on the influence of hedge fund activism on shareholder value seem to send a clear message, interpretations of these results differ. Greenwood and Schor (2009) for example draw the conclusion that hedge fund activism is only successful when the hedge funds sell the firms. Boyson and Mooradian (2007) measured the highest success of hedge fund activism when hedge funds tried to change corporate governance or reduce free cash flow. Therefore, scholars still need to discover the underlying drivers of the success of hedge fund activism, to judge in which cases hedge fund activism can add value to a corporation.
The freedom of action and the success of hedge fund activism are strongly dependent on the general framework in the respective countries. One of the major factors of the general framework is the ownership structure. Until now, the research results and the respective conclusions referring mainly to the US ownership structure in the USA is characterised by a dispersed ownership, as it is in the UK for example. Outside of the Anglo-Saxon realm, the ownership is dominated by major shareholders, e.g. in the Continental Europe (La Porta et al., 1999) . Our study analyses hedge fund activism in Germany, which represents a good example of a country where ownership structure is typically concentrated (Edwards and Weichenrieder, 2004; Weber and Zimmermann, 2013) . Thereby the research about hedge fund activism can be enlarged to countries with concentrated ownership structures, and the influence of the ownership structure on the success of hedge fund activism can be studied.
Our paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the theoretical framework and sets up the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the database and the methodology for the empirical testing. Section 4 presents the results of the empirical testing. The study concludes with the discussion of the results and their implications for future work.
Theory and hypotheses

Hedge fund activism and its impact on share prices
Hedge fund activism addresses conflicts of interest between management and shareholders. The separation of ownership and control generates agency costs which reduce the value of a corporation. A broadly spread ownership structure intensifies the consequences of the separation of ownership and control. Small shareholders do not have sufficient incentives to monitor the management of a corporation, because their costs of monitoring exceed their benefits. The costs of monitoring are independent of the amount of shares held, whereas the benefits of monitoring are correlated positively to the amount of shares held. Therefore, where one shareholder decides to monitor, other shareholders can profit freely from their monitoring activity. Therefore, it is rational for small shareholders to rely on monitoring by others and take a free-rider position (Grossman and Hart, 1980) . The principal-agency theory provides an adequate framework for analysing hedge fund activism. It allows the measurement of changes in the welfare of a corporation which are caused by hedge fund activism. This is possible mainly due to the relationship of agency costs and shareholder value (Bratton, 2007) . Hedge fund activists claim to represent the interests of the shareholders. They have the possibility of reducing agency costs, the costs of the separation between ownership and control (Briggs, 2006) . Agency costs have several determinants, among which are actions of other corporate governance stakeholders, such as the board of directors or banks. The relationship is such that there is more potential for shareholder activism to be successful where other stakeholders do less to reduce agency costs. The ability of hedge funds to reduce agency costs can be traced back to three starting points. The first starting point is the reduction of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986) . It can be achieved, for example, by paying a special dividend (Klein and Zur, 2009 ). Secondly, hedge funds can create value at corporations either through a reorientation of strategy or through the sale of the corporation. A characteristic event for a reorientation of strategy is the sale of company assets which do not belong to the core business of the corporation from the point of view of the hedge fund. The third starting point for hedge funds is the improvement of the corporation's corporate governance system.
Activism by mutual funds and public pension funds basically has the same starting points, but their requirements differ from those of hedge funds. Mutual and public pension funds have inherent conflicts of interest, which prevent an efficient monitoring of the corporations (Greenwood and Schor, 2009 ). Hedge funds do not underlie the same legal and regulatory constraints, so that their investment strategy is generally more flexible. Through lock-up periods, hedge funds can secure themselves against short-term withdrawal of money (Boyson and Mooradian, 2007) . This allows them to invest in more illiquid shares. One of the biggest differences lies in the incentive structures of hedge fund managers. In contrast to managers of mutual funds and public pension funds, hedge fund managers substantially participate in the success of their fund. The fee structure normally consists of a fixed 2% management fee and a variable 20% performance fee (Goldstein, 2007) . Additionally, hedge fund managers invest most of their own fortune in the funds. As a consequence, they have a strong financial incentive to carry out effective activism. In contrast to mutual funds and public pension funds, hedge funds buy shares to improve the shareholder value through their intervention. Their activism does not originate from a long-term passive investor position. Hedge funds actively select corporations which are best suited to improve their shareholder value by activism.
Thus, following the principal-agency theory, large shareholders can reduce the agency cost of the separation of ownership and control (Black, 1998; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) . In contrast to mutual funds and public pension funds, hedge funds satisfy the criteria to carry out effective activism. The market will anticipate the influence of hedge fund activism and react with a short-term increase of the company value.
Hypothesis 1: If a hedge fund buys shares of a company, the shareholder value will increase in the short term.
Three indicators for hedge fund activism in Germany
The excess returns depend on different factors, among the most important of which are the rules for notification of voting rights. Notification rules in the USA allow market participants to differentiate between hedge funds with activist and hedge funds with passive intentions. Shareholders have to state their objectives in the 13d form.
2 In Germany, no comparable form exists. Consequently, the notification of voting rights holds no information for the market participants whether the hedge fund will behave actively or passively. The transparency of the German stock market concerning hedge fund activism is thus lower than in the USA.
Therefore, we introduce three indicators, which can help market participants to distinguish hedge fund activism: (1) activism: hedge funds voluntarily publish their activism and thereby send signals to market participants. (2) Reputation: market participants judge the behaviour of the hedge fund in the past in order to estimate whether it will act as an activist. (3) Takeover rumours: there are typical situations which attract hedge fund activism. One example is the takeover of a company. Studies in the USA showed that hedge fund activism is especially successful in takeovers (Greenwood and Schor, 2009 ). Andrade et al. (2001) studied over 3500 takeovers and measured shortterm excess returns 3 of +16% for the target companies and -0.7% for the acquirers. The shareholders of the target companies are the profiteers of takeovers. Hedge funds can either intervene on the buyer's side (prevention of a takeover) or on the seller's side (increase of purchase price). By preventing a takeover, hedge funds can undo the negative effect of the takeover on the sale price. The prevention of a takeover is difficult in Germany, because the takeover does not have to be approved by the annual shareholders' meeting (AktG § 119). Therefore, hedge funds have to put public pressure on the management or/and try to replace members of the board of directors or the management board to achieve their objectives. Hedge funds have higher bargaining power and earning prospects on the seller's side, especially if the acquirer wants to buy 100% of the shares of the target company. Since 2002, Germany has a squeeze-out law, which lightened the squeeze-out for controlling shareholders (Püttmann, 2006) . It comes into effect above a majority of voting rights of 95%. According to this rule, hedge funds can prevent a squeeze-out if they hold more than 5% of the voting rights. Due to their strong power base, they are able to work towards an increase of the sale price (Gomes, 2001) . Therefore, it is more probable that hedge funds engage on the seller's side. If a hedge fund buys shares during a takeover or after takeover rumours, there is a high probability for hedge fund activism. Market participant can try to identify these situations by looking for takeover rumours when judging hedge fund notifications.
The looser regulations for notification of voting rights in Germany make it necessary that besides the overall excess returns the excess returns of the three indicators mentioned above are studied. Only the consideration of the overall excess returns in connection with the excess returns of those three indicators can give a meaningful estimation of the success of hedge fund activism in Germany. A short-term excess return for the whole sample is no sufficient proof that hedge fund activism leads to excess returns. Excess returns could also be caused by superior stock picking of the hedge funds (Metrick and Yasuda, 2010) . The stock picking hypothesis argues that hedge funds have superior strategies to identify undervalued companies. The shareholder value of a company increases when a hedge fund enters, because the market participants follow the judgement of the hedge fund (Bessler et al., 2013) . The stock picking hypothesis was analysed in the USA by comparing the returns of activist (13d form) and passive hedge fund investments. As the return of activist investment was significantly higher, the stock picking hypothesis was rejected (Brav et al., 2008) . For Germany, we also assume that the stock picking hypothesis does not apply. To test this, we compare the three indicators with the overall return of the hedge fund sample. The excess return of the three indicators has to be significantly higher than the overall excess return to reject the stock picking hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: The excess returns of the three indicators (activism, reputation, takeover rumours) are higher than the excess return of the whole sample.
Long-term development of excess returns
Owing to the limited obligations for notification of voting rights in Germany, the market participants receive only poor information about the intentions of the hedge funds. It can be presumed that a significant part of the hedge funds does not follow an activist strategy. The market participants can use indicators, such as the reputation of the hedge fund, to improve their assessment. But assumptions about the behaviour of any respective hedge fund involve uncertainty nevertheless. For part of the hedge fund events, the activist assumptions for the behaviour of the hedge funds do not hold over time. An initial overvaluation may then decline when new information about the 'real' behaviour enters the marketplace. Therefore, it is not assumed that the whole sample must show an excess return in the long term.
The three indicators offer additional information for the market participants to judge a hedge fund event. Especially the indicator 'takeover rumours' gives a clear signal for hedge fund activism. At takeovers, the objectives of the hedge funds are clearly delineated and the power base is far better than with most of their other objectives. The negotiator for the increase of the sale price is the management of the acquirer, not the management of the target company. The management of the acquirer is under pressure to realise the takeover. Furthermore, the takeover offers benefits for the management such as more power or prestige. The benefits for the management of the acquirer are one of the main reasons for overpayment during takeovers (Roll, 1986) . The constellation offers a high probability for hedge funds to achieve their goal. The expectations of the market participants about these hedge fund events should be met in most cases and therefore, excess returns should especially hold in the long term for 'takeover rumours'. Even though the other two indicators offer less information in the long term, the information should be solid enough to measure positive excess returns. 'activism', 'reputation' and 'takeover rumours' show long-term positive excess returns.
Hypothesis 3: The three indicators
Ownership structure
Until now, the research results and the respective conclusions refer mainly to the USA. The general framework for hedge fund activism in Germany differs considerably from that of the USA, one of the major distinctions being the different ownership structures. Franks and Mayer (1994) separate between an insider-controlled system and an outsidercontrolled system. One of their differentiators is the concentration of ownership. An insider-controlled system is defined by concentrated ownership with the existence of major shareholders. In Germany, the insider-controlled system prevails. A large amount of the shares are held by major shareholders, which often originate from the founders' family (La Porta et al., 1999) . In many cases, these major shareholders hold more than 25% of the shares (Becht and Böhmer, 2003) and hence potentially have a large influence on the companies' policies. 4 The concentration of ownership in the USA is comparably low; only in rare cases do major shareholders exist (La Porta et al., 1999) . The major shareholders are not influenced by the free-rider problem, because their amount of share is high enough to make monitoring profitable (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) . But the incentives to monitor do not depend only on the amount of shares held; the identity of the major shareholder is also important. If the major shareholder is a family or a single person, their wealth is directly linked to the corporation's shareholder value. Thus, a high incentive exists to monitor the management. In contrast, if professional agents are in charge of the major shareholder, the incentive is lower. The major shareholders themselves are then part of an internal principal-agent relationship with the inherent conflicts of interest. This is particularly true if incentives of the agent are not linked to the shareholder value of the organisation; the positive effects of a major shareholder are then mitigated (Edwards and Weichenrieder, 2004) . Therefore, families and single persons have the best qualifications to monitor management among major shareholders. As their voting rights exceed 25%, they have a blocking minority, which entails substantial rights to influence the strategy of the corporation. As a consequence, corporations with families or single persons as major shareholders should offer less potential for hedge fund activism. Furthermore, hedge funds can only achieve their objectives with the acceptance of the family or single person. They are highly dependent on their vote.
Hypothesis 4: The existence of a family or single person as major shareholder is negatively correlated with excess return of hedge fund activism.
Free cash flow reduction
Free cash flow is generated by the conflict of interest between shareholders and management (Jensen, 1986) . The reduction of free cash flow is one of the possibilities to reduce agency costs. Hedge funds can reduce the free cash flow by obtaining an increase in dividends or redemption of a special dividend.
5 Thereby hedge funds prevent management from investments, which would be value destroying for the shareholders. The greater the fraction of free cash flow, the greater the entailed agency costs.
Hypothesis 5: The excess return of hedge fund activism is positively correlated with the ratio of liquid assets to total assets.
Research design
Data
The Securities Trade Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, WpHG), pursuant § § 21 ff., defines the obligations for notification of voting rights in Germany. Every shareholder must notify the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht; BaFin) and the listed company in question of the percentage of his or her holding of voting rights as soon they rise above or fall below certain thresholds (3%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 50% and 75%). 6 Changes in voting rights must be reported to the issuer and to BaFin within four trading days. The issuer then has to publish the notification of voting rights within three trading days. Therefore, the maximum period of time between date of purchase and date of notification is seven trading days.
8 The BaFin maintains a database which comprises all notifications since 1995 (Mietzner and Schweizer, 2014) . The notifications cover the following information: registrant, residence of the registrant, issuer, headquarter of issuer, percentage of holdings, date of notification and media of notification.
The BaFin provided data from its database for the period between 1995 and April 2008, which included 18,133 notifications. They contain the name of the registrant, but not its identity. The database includes notification from all kinds of registrants, so that notifications by hedge funds must first be identified. None of the existing hedge fund databases covers a satisfactory number of hedge funds; activist hedge funds, especially, are often missing (Brav et al., 2008) .
9 Therefore, merging the BaFin database and a hedge fund database is not possible, as too many events would be lost. To find as many events as possible, every registrant was checked separately whether they were a hedge fund or not. The verification was based on multiple sources including the hedge fund database Eureka, a list of activist hedge funds from InvestmentSeek, studies about hedge fund activism, Factiva, Genios and Google. We included all natural persons with linkages to hedge funds.
A lot of events in the BaFin database had the wrong date of notification. Therefore, for all events the date of notification was cross-checked with a second source. 10 Furthermore, the sources were used to identify additional events, which were missing in the BaFin database. As mentioned, the maximum period of time between date of purchase and date of notification is seven trading days. Within this period, the market could be informed by newspapers about the exceeding of the threshold before the official notification. For all events where this is the case, the date of publication of the newspaper replaces the notification date as the event date. Besides the notifications by law, voluntarily notifications by hedge funds were included in the sample. To find the utmost of voluntarily notifications, a two-step approach was followed, using Factiva and Genios as sources. In the first step, the keywords 'hedge funds' and 'activism' and their radicals were used to find articles about hedge fund events. In the second step, the names of the hedge funds were used. They came either from hedge fund events identified in the BaFin data or from the keyword search. If new hedge funds were found in these articles, we also searched for them generally. This iterative process was designed to secure the inclusion of the maximum amount of voluntarily notifications possible.
The notification by law and the voluntarily notifications are merged. If there is more than one hedge fund engaged in a corporation, the hedge fund with the earliest event date is chosen. The other hedge fund events are excluded, if the event date occurs within three months after the first event. Furthermore, repeat filings for an activist-target pair are excluded, if the purpose of the activism stays largely unchanged. After the process described above, the sample consists of 190 events.
In order to avoid bias, further exclusions to the sample are made. If the initial public offer of the target is less than six months before the event date, the event is excluded. All financial companies are excluded, to secure comparability of the operating figures in the regression.
12 Moreover, an event is excluded if the hedge fund falls below the minimum threshold within 20 trading days after the event date. 13 The exclusions reduce the sample from 190 to 136, with 55 different hedge funds and 100 different corporations.
Variables and methods
The semi-strong-form efficiency of the capital market theory implies that the share price immediately incorporates new information (Fama, 1970) . Information about the reduction of agency costs leads instantly to an increase of the shareholder value. Thus, the impact of hedge fund activism can be analysed by measuring the abnormal stock market performance of the target companies around the hedge fund events. The dependent variable of the event study is therefore the abnormal return.
The event study is well established in management and finance research (see, e.g., McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; MacKinlay, 1997; Peterson, 1989 ) and the only empirical method which was used until now to analyse shareholder or hedge fund activism. The event-oriented stock market reactions are measured in an event window. We differentiated between a short-term and a long-term event study.
The short-term event study is the standard technique to measure shareholder value effects of hedge fund activism. The definition of the event window is dependent on the considered event. The more precise the day can be identified on which the market received the new information about the event, the better for the empirical analysis. For notification of voting rights in Germany, the exact date cannot be identified, as the maximum time frame between purchase date and the notification can cover seven trading days.
14 It is possible that market participants receive the information before the notification. This assumption was proved in several studies, including the study by Greenwood and Schor (2009) . To be able to measure all effects by hedge fund activism, we defined a longer event window of 41 trading days (-20 days to +20 days). The abnormal return was calculated by subtracting the market's coincident return from the securities return, which leads in the next step to the cumulative abnormal return. The significance of the abnormal return was tested with a parametric and a non-parametric test. As parametric test, the conventional t-test was used, as it suits best for the analysis of abnormal returns (Brown and Warner, 1985) . The sample showed no evidence to reject the assumption of a normal distribution, so that the t-test can be used. However, an analysis of outsiders made it necessary to further reduce the sample to 133 events. The Wilcoxon rank sum test was employed as the non-parametric test.
The event window for the long-term event study was set at seven months (-1 month to +7 months).
15 Thereby we ensured that most of the information about the hedge fund activism was included and the power of the statistic tests was preserved. On the analysis of long-term abnormal returns, no generally accepted methods exist (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000) . There is a greater risk for bias in the long-term event study than in the short-term event study. Researchers are split into two camps concerning the best method to reduce the bias and to analyse long-term abnormal returns. On the one side are those in favour of the calendar-time portfolio method and on the other, the advocates of the Buyand-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) benchmark method. The most used calendar-time portfolio models are the three-factor-model by Fama and French (1993) and the fourfactor model by Carhart (1997) . We follow the BHAR benchmark method, which is advocated for example by Lyon et al. (1999) and Ritter (1991) . It represents the abnormal return from the view of an investor and is especially suitable for the multiple regressions which follow our event study analysis. The BHAR benchmark method uses a benchmark -we use the CDAX, an index the price development of all German shares across Prime Standard and General Standard (see www.deutsche-boerse.com) -to calculate the normal return.
In addition to the short-term and long-term event studies, we carry out a multiple regression analysis to detect the drivers of the abnormal return. The independent variables were regressed against the abnormal stock return. They comprised the variable from the hypotheses as well as the control variables. We use the control variables to ensure that no correlation is missed. They cover the same areas as the variables from the hypotheses. The time frames are the same as the ones for the event study, i.e. 41 trading days for the short-term and seven months for the long-term analysis, respectively.
The variables originate from different sources. The share prices of the target companies and the CDAX come from Bloomberg, as well as the market cap and the market cap to common equity. For the financial ratios, the Worldscope database was used. As there are now 13d filings in Germany, the objectives of the hedge funds had to be searched in the press using Genios and Factiva. The ownership variables are based on the Thomson ownership in combination with the Hoppenstedt database. 16 In order to classify the holders of the share packages, the classification of the Thomson Ownership database was supplemented by press research via Factiva and Genios. The variables concerning the ownership structure were measured at the end of the preceding quarter of the event. All operating figures from Bloomberg and Worldscope refer to the last financial year preceding the event.
To overcome the lack of 13d fillings in Germany, we used three binary indicators for hedge fund activism: activism, reputation and takeover rumours. For activism, we checked in Factiva and Genios if the hedge fund voluntarily published their activism after the hedge fund event. By contrast, the reputation indicator is based on activism of the hedge fund in other cases before the hedge fund event. In order to judge the reputation of a hedge fund for activism, we checked the 13d filling as well as Factiva and Genios five years prior to the event. For every hedge fund event, the three months before the event were checked for clear signals of a possible takeover, to judge the indicator takeover rumours.
We used different models for the multiple regressions to address our hypotheses. One of the models deals with influences of the objectives of hedge fund activism on the abnormal return. For 37 of the events, objectives were identified. The objectives were classified in eight well-defined categories, those being (1) increase of dividends, (2) other changes in the capital structure, (3) change of the business strategy, (4) sale of companies assets, (5) increase of the sale price within a takeover, (6) replacement of members of the board of directors or management, (7) other corporate governance goals, (8) all other objectives which could not be allocated to one of the categories. For the distribution of the objectives as well as the distribution of hedge funds events across time and the ownership structure of the target companies, see Tables 1 and 2 . 
Results
We tested our hypotheses by carrying out four different tests. First we measured the abnormal return following a hedge fund event in the short and long terms with an event study. Secondly, a multiple regression -again short and long terms -was conducted to discover the underlying drivers of the abnormal returns.
Short-term event study (Hypotheses 1 and 2)
Within the short-term event study, we analysed six event windows, focusing on the event window [-20 d; 20 d] . Consistent with the previous research in the USA, the abnormal return of the whole sample (Group 'all') is significantly positive (see Table 3 ). This holds for all event windows. For the event window [-20 d; 20 d] , an abnormal return of 3.47% was measured. The result is significant at the 1% level. Thus, the results support Hypothesis 1 that hedge fund activism leads to short-term abnormal returns. Notes: This table presents the CARs for different time frames, the t-value and the level of significance. Excess returns are defined as the difference in the target firms' returns and the return of the market index (CDAX) in the time frame. Day 0 is the date the market receives information, either through the notification of voting rights or through the press. *Significance of the one-sided t-values at the 90% level. **Significance of the one-sided t-values at the 95%. ***Significance of the one-sided t-values at the 99% level.
The abnormal returns of the three indicators are also significantly different from zero. The highest abnormal return is measured for the group 'takeover rumours' with 9.09%, followed by the group 'activism' with 8.75% and the group 'reputation' with 5/32%. These results are only an indicator for Hypothesis 2. To verify the hypothesis, an independent sample t-test was used, shown in Table 4 . It analyses the differences between the three indicators and the whole sample, and tests the significance of these differences. The results confirm Hypothesis 2, as they show significant differences in the abnormal returns for all three groups. The significance level is 5% for the group 'activism' and 10% for the groups 'reputation' and 'takeover rumours'. Especially the two groups 'activism' and 'takeover rumours' show a large difference of 6-7%. The Mann-Whitney U test confirmed the results for the groups 'activism' and 'takeover rumours', whereas it could not measure a significant difference for the group 'reputation'. We were also interested in the abnormal returns, when they are split up on the basis of the objectives of the hedge funds. Four of the eight categories were large enough for the analysis: groups 'general', 'sell assets', 'increased sale price at takeover' and 'replacement of board of directors or management'. Table 5 shows the abnormal returns for these groups. Again, our observation focuses on the event window [-20 d, 20 d] . For the group 'general', no significant abnormal return was measured. The same applies to the group 'increased sale price at takeover', even though the abnormal return is 4.57%. The other two groups instead evidence a significant abnormal return at the 5% level. The group 'sell assets' has an abnormal return of 13.18% and the group 'replacement of board of directors or management' 9.88%. The results show that some objectives might be especially successful for hedge fund activists. 
Long-term event study (Hypothesis 3)
The event window of the long-term event study is from one month before the event to six months after the event (see Table 6 ). For the whole sample, represented by the group 'all', a negative abnormal return of -0.94% is measured. The same is true for the groups 'activism' and 'takeover rumours' with a negative abnormal return of -0.89% and -1.68%, respectively. The only group with a positive abnormal return of 1.3% is the group 'reputation', but the return is not significantly different from zero. Therefore, our Hypothesis 3 cannot be verified. None of the three indicators seems to lead to positive abnormal returns six months after the event. Notes: This table presents the BHARs for different time frames, t-values and the level of significance. Excess returns are defined as the difference in the target firms' returns and the return of the market index (CDAX) in the time frame. Day 0 is the date the market receives information, either through the notification of voting rights or through the press. *Significance of the one-sided t-values at the 90% level. **Significance of the one-sided t-values at the 95% level. ***Significance of the one-sided t-values at the 99% level.
Again, we took a look at the abnormal returns grouped for the objectives of the hedge fund activists (Table 7) . The analysis yielded no significant positive abnormal return, with three of the four groups having negative abnormal returns. The only exception is the group 'sell assets', which has an abnormal return of 10.19%. Even though the return is not statistically different from zero, it gives an indication that the sale of assets might be a successful strategy for hedge fund activists. Notes: This table presents the BHARs for different time frames, t-values and the level of significance. Excess returns are defined as the difference in the target firms' returns and the return of the market index (CDAX) in the time frame. Day 0 is the date the market receives information, either through the notification of voting rights or through the press. *Significance of the two-sided t-values at the 90% level. **Significance of the two-sided t-values at the 95% level. ***Significance of the two-sided t-values at the 99% level.
Multiple regressions (Hypotheses 4 and 5)
We conducted multiple regressions for the short-and the long-term event windows. Both multiple regressions comprise six different models. The multiple regressions also include the three indicators of Hypothesis 2 and the objectives of the hedge fund activists (see Table 8 ). The independent variables are activism (ACTIVE); reputation (REPUT); takeover rumours (TAKEOVER); dummy variable, family or single investor holds more than 25% of the shares (MS_FA); amount of free float (FREEFLOAT); dummy variable, major shareholder with more than 25% of the shares excluding families and single investors (MS_nFA); sum of shares held by institutional investors (SH_INST); sum of shares held by corporations (SH_C); sum of shares held by private equity (SH_PE); sum of shares held by hedge funds excl. the activist when amount of shares is bigger than 3% (SH_HF); maximum amount of share of the hedge fund activist during the event window. Groups formed after the thresholds 3%, 5% and 10% (SH_HFA); BHAR of the past year (Ri); market cap (MC); market cap to common equity (MCCE); return on assets (ROA); cash flow to total assets (CFA); cash and equivalents as percentage of current assets (CACA); dividends per share (DS); total debt as percentage of total assets (TDTA); group objective, general (O_GE); group objective, sell assets (O_SA); group objective, increase sale price (O_IS); group objective, change management (O_CM). The variable concerning the ownership structure were measured at the end of the preceding quarter of the event. All operating figures refer to the last financial year preceding the event. *Significance at the 90% level. **Significance at the 95% level. ***Significance at the 99% level.
We start the examination with the multiple regression for the event window [-20 d, 20 d] .
The indicator for activism is positive and significant with a significance level of minimum 5%. The other two indicators showed no influence on the short-term abnormal return. We find no support for Hypothesis 4, which states that the existence of a family or single person as a major shareholder negatively correlates with the excess returns. The second model dealt with the ownership structure, but revealed no influence of the ownership structure on the abnormal returns. The only exception is constituted by the sum of shares held by other hedge funds. The independent variable is positive and significant for two of the four models. Our Hypothesis 5 dealt with the influence of free cash flow on the success of hedge fund activism. We cannot find support for our hypothesis, as the cash and equivalents taken as percentages of current assets indicate no significant correlation. The results for the group 'sell assets' of the long-term event study are verified by a positive and significant correlation (see again Table 8 ). We measured three other independent variables with a significant correlation: the market capitalisation and the total debt as percentage of total assets are positively correlated and the market cap to common equity negatively correlated.
Conducting the long-term multiple regression, we used the same independent variables as for the short-term multiple regression. None of the three indicators is significantly correlated with the long-term abnormal returns (Table 9 ). Our Hypothesis 4 concerning large family owners is verified. For all models, the existence of a large family owner is negatively correlated with abnormal returns. The assumptions from Hypothesis 5 are also supported. The cash and equivalents as percentage of current assets provide a positive and significant correlation. The results for the cash flow to total assets reinforce Hypothesis 5. As for the short-term multiple regressions, the objective 'sell assets' has a positive significant effect on the abnormal return. The other independent variables with significant correlations were the same as for the short-term multiple regression; only the correlation of the market cap was no longer significant. ; maximum amount of share of the hedge fund activist during the event time frame. Groups formed after the thresholds 3%, 5% and 10% (SH_HFA); BHAR of the past year (Ri); market cap (MC); market cap to common equity (MCCE); return on assets (ROA); cash flow to total assets (CFA); cash and equivalents as percentage of current assets (CACA); dividends per share (DS); total debt as percentage of total assets (TDTA); group objective, general (O_GE); group objective, sell assets (O_SA); group objective, increase sale price (O_IS); group objective, change management (O_CM). The variables concerning the ownership structure were measured at the end of the preceding quarter of the event. All operating figures refer to the last financial year preceding the event. *Significance at the 90% level. **Significance at the 95% level. ***Significance at the 99% level.
Discussion
The success of hedge fund activism in the USA raises expectations for hedge fund activism in Germany. These expectations are only partly confirmed. The results make clear that the assumption is wrong; hedge fund activism in Germany would also lead automatically to long-term abnormal returns. The results verify our main hypotheses, especially about the ownership structure, and clarify the difference of hedge fund activism between Germany and the USA. The short-term event study confirmed the results from the studies in the USA. The sample as a whole is unsuitable for a comparison with the USA, due to the differences in the obligations for the notification of voting rights. The abnormal returns of the three groups 'activism', 'reputation' and 'takeover rumours' are better suited. They show similar abnormal returns as those from studies from the USA. Thus, it can be concluded that the market reacts similarly positively to hedge fund activism as in the USA. The significantly larger abnormal returns of the three groups in comparison to the abnormal return of the whole sample indicate that the market judges activist behaviour by hedge funds more positively than passive behaviour. The stock picking hypothesis can be rejected, which is in line with the work of Brav et al. (2008) .
The short-term event window is too short to include all information about the hedge fund events. Therefore, a short-term abnormal return does not have to continue on a longterm basis (Oler et al., 2008) . This is especially true for Germany, as the market participants have indications only about the intentions of the hedge funds (Mietzner et al., 2011) . The market transparency for hedge fund activism is lower than in the USA. In contrast to the USA, the short-term abnormal return does not continue in the long term. Neither the whole sample nor the three groups show a significant abnormal return six months after the event.
The multiple regression analysis provides insights which help in understanding the different results when compared to those obtained in the USA. However, first it also indicated a similarity. The multiple regressions measured a positive significant correlation for the indicator 'activism' in the short term but not in the long term. Clifford (2008) observed the same phenomenon. The voluntary publication of activism seems only valuable in the short term. The indicator 'activism' only informs the market about activism in general, but not about the underlying objectives. To judge activism six months after the event, this information is no longer sufficient. Then the objectives of the hedge fund activism become crucial. This is also shown as the group 'sell assets' having a significant positive correlation in the short as well as the long term. Market participants seem to assume positive effects from hedge fund activism especially when a sale of assets is aspired. The sale of unnecessary business division can create value by refocusing the corporation on its core (Zook, 2001) . A similar effect for the USA was measured by Clifford (2008) , Greenwood and Schor (2009) and Brav et al. (2008) , however only for the short term. It is surprising that the market does not expect the same positive effects from the objective 'increase sale price at takeover'. This contradicts the success hedge funds have with this request.
Three of the five events showed a negative abnormal return six months after the event.
17 In all the cases, the hedge funds were able to enforce their request after circa one year and achieved an average increase in the sale price of 10%. 18 The market participants seem to underestimate the success of hedge fund activism to increase the sale price at takeovers. The free cash flow hypothesis is verified in the long-term multiple regressions. The more free cash flow the target company has, the higher is its abnormal return.
The results for the ownership structure reinforce the assumption that the general framework influences the success of hedge fund activism. The influence of the existence of major family shareholders on the excess returns is verified. Long-term success of hedge fund activism is negatively correlated with their existence. The specific ownership structure thus plays a major role in explaining the abnormal return of shareholder activism in Germany. Two patterns of explanations might apply: either the major family shareholders secure a better monitoring of the management, reducing the agency costs of the separation between ownership and control, in which case the potential for hedge funds to reduce agency costs is smaller, or hedge fund activism could have a positive effect on reduction of agency costs, but market participants as well as the hedge funds underestimate the influence of the major family shareholders. Hedge funds mainly originate from countries without major family shareholders. Major family shareholders have a blocking minority and can hinder unpleasant proposals coming from the hedge funds. Thus, hedge funds are highly dependent on their opinion.
Long-term event studies and long-term multiple regressions are more vulnerable to being biased than are short-term analyses. The bias may come, for example, from temporal overlap of events. The evaluation of the long-term results has to take this into consideration (Cowan and Sergeant, 2001 ).
Conclusions and implications
Our study contributes to the shareholder activism literature as it analyses hedge fund activism in a country where the ownership structure is dominated by large major shareholders. Until now, studies about hedge fund activism mainly treated countries with dispersed ownership structures. The ownership structure in Germany is exemplary for a lot of other countries where large major shareholders exist and wield considerable power in determining corporate policy (Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009 ). These countries often do not belong to the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system (La Porta et al., 1999) . The existence of large family shareholders seems to reduce the success of hedge fund activism. Our study gives indications for the success of hedge fund activism in countries with similar ownership structures. We hope this study will initiate further research in these countries to test our findings. Therewith, the knowledge concerning the relationship between the ownership structure and the success of hedge fund activism could be deepened. Furthermore, studies should be conducted to understand the underlying drivers of the influence of large family shareholder on hedge funds activism success in Germany. Thereby, it could be better understood if the resistance of large family shareholders against hedge fund activism has positive or negative effects, if any, on the development of the target companies, and in which cases hedge fund activism can create value for companies with major family shareholders. Finally, it has to be seen as a limitation of our study that it takes only the interests of shareholders, but not of other stakeholders such as employees or creditors, into account. Future research should fill this research gap in order to meet concerns which are especially widespread in continental Europe (see, e.g., Hall and Soskice, 2001) .
Our study has implications for governmental institutions, for investors and for the management of corporations which have hedge funds among their shareholders. During the financial crisis that shocked the world in 2007 and 2008, hedge funds were seen by many politicians as an evil that has to be confined by strict regulatory rules. One concern was that hedge funds may be designed to search for short-term profits at the expense of the long-term interests of other stakeholders of business firms (Kahan and Rock, 2007) . Our research confirms research results from the Anglo-Saxon sphere that from an ex ante perspective, hedge funds do create shareholder value. Ex post, i.e. in the long-term perspective, this may look different. Our study measured abnormal positive returns only under specific conditions, when hedge funds activism is linked to takeover rumours. Investors can profit from this information, as they can achieve positive returns by following hedge funds in takeover situations. For companies, our study shows that hedge fund activism in Germany is no side issue. Companies should be prepared to become targets of hedge fund activism. The significant abnormal positive returns in relation to claims of selling assets indicate that there are still a lot of businesses reducing the value of their parent companies.
